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ABSTRACT
While there is an obvious concern that “new organizational forms” are appearing, and
despite the topic receiving increased attention, scholars, as yet, have been unable to theorize,
grasp or account for these new forms adequately. In continuing to look for the ‘new’ with
‘old’ lenses, we are seeing neither real departure from Weberian conceptualizations other
than oppositional approaches still in search of an essential entity, nor much consideration
given to the possibility that the paradigmatic approach to form is also part of the problem.
In light of this, I posit that thinking within a modernist epistemological framework has
served to limit our horizons when it comes to studying “form”. How to move out of such a
framework? Adopting an amodern or nonmodern epistemological framework, as suggested
by Latour (1993a), I propose problematizing the notion of “organizational form” by focusing
on the practices of “organizational forming.” To expand the limits to our understanding of
the organizational, therefore, I argue an amodern metatheoretical framing facilitates paying
attention to how organizational forming is performed, such that what we come to identify as
“new organizational forms” is achieved, if at all.

ORGANIZATIONAL FORM – IS IT AN ISSUE?
The topic of organizational form has gained increased attention in the scholarly
literature over the past couple of decades or so (e.g., Academy of Management Journal 2001;
Aldrich and Mueller 1982; Astley 1985; Child and McGrath, 2001; Daft and Lewin 1993;
Fligstein and Freeland 1995; Fombrum 1988; Foss 2002: Hawley 1988; Lewin and Volberda
1999; McKendrick and Carroll 2001; Organization Science 1999; Romanelli 1991: Tushman
and Romanelli 1985). For organizational scholars, the very concept of form is at the heart of
organization studies (Fulk and DeSanctis 1995: 337; Rindova and Kotha 2001: 1263), such
that “[w]here new organizational forms come from is one of the central questions of
organizational theory” (Rao 1998: 912).
The relevance of this topic is often portrayed as ‘new times’ driving the need for ‘new
forms’, however, what is more evident in the literature is that the need for new ways of
looking at organizational form has yet to be addressed. Both the popular and the scholarly
literature are focused on identifying if new types of organization are emerging that could be
characterized as new forms and, more importantly for the scholarly domain, whether there are
sufficient theoretical and empirical developments that could engage in the proper
identification, and classification of these new forms. However, rather than heed the persistent
calls for new theory grounded in the empirical examination of new forms, researchers
continue to use existing theoretical frameworks and seek to align their studies and findings
accordingly. In essence, the mainstream continues to look for the ‘new’ with ‘old’ lenses.
The vast majority of work appearing on the topic of new organizational forms,
therefore, comes from an ontologically realist and an epistemologically positivist perspective.
Hence, though there is theoretical variety within this realist and positivist frame, most
discussions are limited to the confines of a functionalist paradigm and continue to view form
as something already formed, as an essence, with the attention focused on what constitutes
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form. That is, few theoretical developments address how what we eventually identify as a
given organizational form is achieved in practice. As such, the problem that “new
organizational forms” presents to the field is precisely located in the inability of the field to
think in other than “form” itself. In other words, there is neither real departure from
Weberian conceptualizations other than oppositional approaches still in search of an essential
entity, nor is there much consideration given to the possibility that the paradigmatic approach
to the problem is also part of the problem (Brown 1992).
With these arguments as my point of departure, I posit that thinking within a
modernist epistemological framework, as evidenced by the functionalist orientation of this
literature, has served to limit our horizons when it comes to studying “form”. How to move
out of such a framework? “Can we think in any other way” (Calás and Smircich 2003: 49),
such that we do not become enmeshed in, and continue to reproduce, the problems we
encounter when thinking in a modern way? Adopting an amodern or nonmodern
epistemological framework, as suggested by Latour (1993a), calls to our attention the vast
materially heterogeneous spaces where actor-networks are being performed – built,
negotiated, shaped, ordered, unraveled – and from whence essences, forms, a given order
may emerge as effects (e.g., Akrich 1992; Berglund and Werr 2000; Brigham and Corbett
1997; Cooper and Law 1995; Czarniawska and Joerges 1995; Doolin 2003; Gherardi and
Nicolini 2000; Law 1994; Lee and Hassard 1999). It is through attending to such spaces that
we can explore how it is that organizational forming is performed and address such questions
as: How is organizational form performed through purification (boundary-making,
classification)? What translation happens? What hybrids emerge? Such a framework
facilitates us in problematizing the notion of “organizational form” and so begin to outline the
contours of an alternative way of thinking and knowing that will allow us reinsert the
dynamic into the organizational.
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In what follows, I start out by summarizing the state of play of organizational form in
the scholarly literature, focusing on the areas argued to be in need of attention, i.e., new
theory, definition of form, and classification. With this backdrop, I move on to argue that our
understanding of organizational form comes from a particular way of knowing. From here,
and in the spirit of a “modest sociology” (Law 1994), I seek to, very broadly, outline how we
can begin to think differently about “organizational form”.

FORMING “ORGANIZATIONAL FORM” – THE DEBATE SO FAR
Organizational form, as an issue, has been the focus of attention since Weber’s (1946,
1947) formulation of the ideal-type bureaucracy. Over the last couple of decades, and largely
premised on the notion of ‘new times’ as the driver, organizational scholars have identified
the emergence and evolution of new organizational forms as a critical issue to be addressed
(e.g., Academy of Management Journal 2001; Aldrich and Mueller 1982; Astley 1985; Child
and McGrath 2001; Daft and Lewin 1993; Fombrum 1988; Foss 2002: Hawley 1988; Lewin
and Volberda 1999; McKendrick and Carroll 2001; Organization Science 1999; Romanelli
1991: Tushman and Romanelli 1985). Though research on the topic is considered
embryonic, it is attracting increasing attention and a stream of research, coming from an array
of theoretical perspectives, has emerged dealing with how new forms emerge and become
embedded in the organizational landscape.
Romanelli (1991) noted that, though there has existed for a long time a need for
research and theory development on new organizational forms, this need was only beginning
to be addressed. However, in addressing this need, she asserted that: (1) theoretical
consensus was absent; (2) conceptual approaches were diverging; (3) there were no
overarching themes to integrate the many theoretical perspectives formulated about the
emergence of new forms; (4) there was no established universal definition of the form

3

concept in use; and (5) there was a paucity of theoretically directed empirical work to
validate the claims of any approach to the issue. With scholars only recently paying
increased attention to this issue, she suggested that the absence of synthesis or integration
was probably for the better for it would facilitate conceptual development. Indeed, rather
than call for consensus, convergence and integration, Romanelli suggested that diversity be
embraced, differences among concepts be emphasized and the value of different definitions
be demonstrated through empirical research informed and directed by theory.
Ten years later, McKendrick and Carroll (2001) “believe that the definition and use of
organizational form has become, if anything, more elastic” (662). For all intents and
purposes, the concept remains relatively ambiguous in that it means different things
dependent on the theoretical focus or interests of the researcher. McKendrick and Carroll
(2001) cite the 1999 issue of Organization Science, which focused on the topic of form, and
note, “The editors of that issue never defined the term, but in articles it was variously equated
with population, industry, M-Form, functional form, divisional form, matrix form, virtual
corporation, boundaryless organization, hollow corporation, dynamic network form, cellular
organization, hypertext organization, platform organization and shamrock organization”
(662).
Similarly, in also noting that not one of the ten papers comprising the focused issue of
Organization Science defined organizational form, Foss (2002: 1) contends that the concept is
both “ill-defined at the core and fuzzy at the edges, yet clearly seems to capture real
phenomena.” And further, in the special research forum on new and evolving forms
appearing in the Academy of Management Journal (2001), the editors never defined the
concept, which was variously equated in the articles with modularity, specialist
organizational form, multinational corporation, vertical integration, virtual global teams,
bureaucracy and feminist bureaucracy.
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In short, it would appear that in just over ten years little has changed with regard to
the issues raised by Romanelli (1991) in that they still remain a focus of interest and
discussion. Even though the very concept of form is considered to be at the heart of
organization studies, the existing literature highlights problems that still need to be tackled if
new forms are to be identified.
Need for New Theory and Empirical Work
Though there is a sense that sufficient evidence exists as testimony to the presence of
multiple organizational forms, there is a paucity by way of theory and of theoretically
directed empirical research to account for this variability (Child and McGrath 2001; Fligstein
and Freeland 1995; Romanelli 1991). Despite theoretical interest in the emergence of new
forms, a generalizable model explaining the development of such forms has yet to be
produced (Ruef, 2000).
While the historical emergence of new organizational forms is of crucial importance
to a number of major organizational theories (Ruef, 2000), such as structural contingency,
institutional, population ecology and transaction cost economics, each of these macro level
theoretical perspectives treats form as an essence, as a durable, tangible and relatively
undeniable structure, which exists as an empirical entity whether or not it is perceived and
labeled by the individual. Taken as a given ‘out there’, each approach equates form with, and
classifies form as, a set of essential and identifiable characteristics that are what constitutes
the organizational, the particular mix of characteristics serving to create a boundary
distinguishing one form from another. Central to each approach, therefore, is the
development of classification schemes and the construction and maintenance of boundaries to
render forms distinct and identifiable. In terms of identifying new forms, each of these
theoretical approaches is limited to seeing form as determined by “an autonomous and
inexorable logic of structural causality” (Reed 2003: 294), such as fit with environment,
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institutional norms, market strategies or exchange conditions (Nickerson and Zenger 2002).
Thus it is that new forms can only be seen as emerging in accordance with the dictates of
given, pre-existing and constraining contingencies.
While it is appropriate to recognize recent attempts to account for new forms (e.g.
Academy of Management Journal 2001; Organization Science 1999), the sense of a disjoint
between the capacity of existing theoretical perspectives to explain the rapid development of
new forms in practice remains prevalent. Echoing Daft and Lewin’s (1993) concern that
scholars have been slow to engage in empirical studies and in developing new theory, Lewin
and Volberda (1999) suggest that the theory essential to explaining new forms awaits a more
comprehensive development. Similarly, Child and McGrath (2001) suggest that the time is
ripe both for reflection on theory in an effort to understand new and evolving organizational
forms and for new theory grounded in the empirical examination of these new forms.
Need for Definition of Form Concept
Added to the calls for new theory, there is concern that researchers use the form
concept in many different ways and often without precise definition (McKendrick and Carroll
2001; Romanelli 1991). Indeed, while form is frequently invoked when analyzing
organizations, Pólos, Hannan and Carroll (2002) contend that careful theoretical analysis has
not been paid to the concept itself.
Organizational form is most commonly defined in terms of specific, core features,
with organizations having the same core features belonging to the same form (Carroll and
Hannan 2000), which is a mode of representation having roots in Weber’s rational-legal
bureaucracy (McKendrick and Carroll 2001). As noted by Rindova and Kotha (2001: 1263),
the term form is employed by organizational scholars in describing patterns or features of
organization (McKelvey 1982), by economists in contrasting two opposing governance
mechanisms, hierarchy and market (Williamson 1975), and by ecologists in identifying
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characteristics that classify an organization as belonging to a group of similar organizations
(Romanelli 1991).
In broad terms, therefore, the form concept can be understood as comprising, on one
level, the characteristics that serve to identify an organization as a distinct entity and, at
another level, identifying the organization as belonging to a group of similar organizations
(Romanelli 1991). McKendrick and Carroll (2001) are of the view that attention to the
concept of organizational form would continue to benefit organization theory, noting at the
same time that “many proposed definitions are abstract to the point of being vague, and thus
lack bite” (662).
Need for Classification
While a commonly accepted and comprehensive classification system has yet to be
developed, scholars also take different views on the value of such a system. Supporters of
taxonomic research (e.g., McKelvey 1982; Rich 1992) believe there is a need for theory and
methods to help in classifying forms according to their differences and similarities, so as to
both increase confidence in the generalizability of research findings and arrive at a stable
classificatory scheme against which so-called new organizational forms can be identified and
assessed.
DeSanctis and Fulk (1999) contend that current research is largely focused on “such
dichotic concepts as market versus hierarchy or bureaucratic versus post-bureaucratic” (498).
Echoing McKelvey (1982) and Rich (1992), and in contrast to Romanelli (1991), DeSanctis
and Fulk call for the development of refined and meaningful typologies of organizational
form that “would provide a basis for identifying an array of new organizational forms that
differ in observable ways in memberships, relationships, groupings, adaptation styles,
competencies, boundaries, and so on” (498-499), in addition to allowing for organizations of
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different eras to be systematically differentiated along common dimensions of research
interest.
On the other hand, those who refrain from developing a classification scheme (e.g.,
Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1989) are of the view that classifying an organization as one form
or another is best left to be specified according to the interests of the individual researcher.
Such a flexible approach recognizes that forms cannot be readily collapsed into a few tidy
categories, thus allowing researchers more space to develop intuitive, descriptive distinctions
(Romanelli 1991) inferred from an organization’s formal structure or normative order
(Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1989).

SO, WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US?
While differing views on organizational form have emerged, they very much involve
a particular way of understanding, in line with what Cooper and Law (1995: 263) refer to as a
‘distal theory of organizations’. They have emerged from a macro organization theory
perspective concerned with the creation and maintenance of boundaries, with categorization
and classification and with the very notion of ‘form’ itself. The view from the existing
literature, coming as it does from a largely determinist and positivist perspective, limits
understanding through establishing the world as external to cognition, collective action or
experience, rendering organizations as “hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures”
(Burrell and Morgan 1979: 4), completely determined by their environment and knowable
through a search for “regularities and causal relationships” (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 5).
Consistent with this way of understanding, the perpetually dynamic is placed into a
field of stasis and stabilized for the purpose of scientific study (Burrell 1996), such that
organizations appear as static entities capable of being partitioned out and classified. Current
ways of understanding also both lock into, and are locked in, such dichotomous thinking as
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micro/macro, inside/outside and new/old. The notion of ‘form’ itself, being a noun, conjures
up the sense of something that is always-already ‘formed’, of something that has shape, of
something static, of a mode of existence or manifestation. Hence, to study form, as
understood in this light, is to study something that already ‘has form’ or has essence.
Further, the same theories, tools, and ways of understanding, which were developed to
analyze notions of the organizational at a particular time, namely bureaucracy, are being
deployed in attempts at generating knowledge about the organizational in ‘new times’.
Concurrently, theories, definitions and classification systems are used in the literature, and
espoused as definitive means for studying form, even though their use is the subject of
ongoing debate over how to theorize, define and classify form.
Altogether, the dominant approach to understanding form is embedded within a
modernist epistemological framework. How to move out of such a modernist epistemological
framework? “Can we think in any other way” (Calás and Smircich 2003: 49), such that we
do not become enmeshed in, and continue to reproduce, the problems we encounter when
thinking in a modern way? How can we articulate and study the organizational differently?
An avenue worth exploring is Latour’s (1993a) amodern or nonmodern epistemological
framework, which facilitates us in problematizing the notion of “organizational form” and so
begin to outline the contours of an alternative way of thinking and knowing that will allow us
reinsert the dynamic into the organizational.

AN AMODERN FRAMEWORK – UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
DIFFERENTLY
As Latour (1993a) sees it, modernity involves the creation and maintenance of two
distinct ontological zones, with all that is nonhuman ascribed to nature and all that is human
ascribed to society. Accordingly, the work of organizational scholars is focused on one zone
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or the other, treating the world according to either the authority of the natural sciences, on the
one hand, or that of the social sciences, on the other. In either case, the work of scholars is to
explain, to purify, the world they see in their terms. Those coming from the perspective of
nature, the realists, seek to naturalize society by integrating it into nature, while those coming
from the perspective of society, the social constructionists, seek to socialize nature through
digestion by society (Latour 1993a).
Hence, looked at through the lens of the natural sciences, all that has to do with
organization is governed by natural laws. Looked at through the lens of the social sciences, it
is we humans who create organization according to our own free will. Accordingly,
organization is either transcendental, having an existence ‘out there’, or it is immanent,
having an existence ‘in here’, and great effort is expended in ensuring that both views remain
ontologically pure. Nature deals with things-in-themselves, while culture deals with humansamongst-themselves, such that people and things, humans and nonhumans are kept separate.
Our work as organizational scholars, therefore, is to discover facts about
organizational forms existing ‘out there’ or to treat form as some emergent social
construction. But, treating organizational form as transcendental renders problematic
knowing form. How can we know something that is transcendental? Similarly, treating
organizational form as immanent renders problematic giving some shape to form for
immanence renders permanence and durability impossible. If some form of stability is
impossible through perpetual immanence, how can we ever give name to organizational
form?
To overcome this apparent paradox, and without apparent contradiction, modernity
treats nature as immanent in the sense that its laws are mobilizable, humanizable and
socializable, in essence, knowable, through manipulation by the modern knowledge-making
apparatus (e.g., laboratories, questionnaires, experiments, statistical analyses, research
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organizations, scientific institutions). Accordingly, the laws of nature can now be discovered,
such that organization can be known, albeit they still remain transcendent. Similarly, society
is simultaneously treated as transcendent in the sense that it has its own laws and outlasts us,
with conventional ways of knowledge-making “stak[ing] out the limits to the freedom of
social groups, and transform[ing] human relations into durable objects that no one has made”
(Latour 1993a: 37). Hence, our freedom to create organization according to our own will is
circumscribed by the laws of society, albeit these laws are our own creation.
Seen in light of the above, thinking within the functionalist paradigm views
organizational form as pure fact, having a reality ‘out there’, holding to the notion that people
are not the ones who make organizational form; rather form has always been there and has
always already existed, such that we are merely unearthing its secrets. Hence, even though
we construct organizational form, it is as if we did not construct it. Similarly, work coming
from an interpretivist position would view organizational form, should it be named so, as
pure social construction, having a reality ‘in here’, holding to the notion that it is people, and
only people, who construct organizational form, even though we rely on things to sustain our
construction and so give it essence.
Viewed from this perspective, modernity provides no means of escape from ‘old’
ways of thinking and knowing and so provides no useful avenue for articulating and studying
the organizational differently, for modernity is part and parcel of the way organizations have
been conceptualized and studied. Thus, how can we articulate and study the organizational
differently? I argue that one way around this impasse is to imagine, as Latour (1993a) has
done, that we have never been modern. His amodern (or nonmodern) thesis rests on
exposing, and then tying together, the practices that underpin modern ways of thinking and
knowing. By making these operations visible, he provides a way to reconsider our
understanding about “organizational form”.

11

Purification. As already discussed, having created two separate ontological zones,
modernity’s focus remains on maintaining that separation. As such, to be modern is to be
concerned with maintaining the established purity of nature on the one hand, and of society
on the other: to be modern requires engaging in the practice of purification. Such practice, in
turn, requires categorization and classification, with things-in-themselves assigned to nature
and humans-in-themselves assigned to society.
Through purifying practices, for example, what we know as virtual organization is a
set of separate and discrete characteristics, each of which allows for this form to be classified
as it is. Thus, we can describe virtual organization (Byrne 1993; Chesbrough and Teece
1996; Davidow and Malone 1992) as ‘organizationless organization’, where structure is
temporarily created in the process of individuals making contact with other individuals to
work on particular problems. Yet, it is that through purifying that the virtual organization can
be identified as a form. It has been classified and categorized according to an abstract,
already known, i.e., pertaining to ‘old forms’, set of features (environment, structure,
authority-control, decision-making, workers, operations, core/non-core, communication,
culture, etc.), such that it is now static, permanent, timeless, universal and, above all,
knowable. In being purified, it has become an ideal-type against which to measure and verify
that which pertains to virtual organization.
But the most important question is, in order to purify, what has the knowledgemaking enterprise left out? Thus, to focus on the practice of purification is only part of the
story, for there is another practice, that of translation, on which modernity depends for its
existence and yet which modernity denies at the same time.
Translation and networks. Concurrent with purifying the messy world of humans
and nonhumans in which we live, modernity engages another practice, that of translation.
Different from the practice of purification, which involves separation, the practice of
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translation involves the threading together of any or all of these actors into a network that
makes sense. It entails interconnecting these heterogeneous elements and viewing them as
performing relationally, as interacting to produce what we contingently call, for example,
virtual organization.
What do we see happening in a virtual organization? Taking the case of a team of
geographically dispersed people working collaboratively to develop a project, for the project
to be successful, not only does it need people with appropriate expertise, but it also depends
on them using compatible software and hardware on which to produce their memos, reports
and messages. It requires that they have access to the Internet, which in turn requires a
system of standards, protocols, cables, switches, servers, and so on, to share their work
product amongst one another. Their work product itself must be transformed into bytes by
their computer software, such that it can be saved and retrieved many times over, and into
data packets by data transmission software, such that it can be transmitted from one email
address to another over data networks. Thus, for the project to be successful, it must enroll
these diverse materials, and others, into a network of actors that we may come to call a virtual
organization. The project’s success requires that all of these materials perform in relation to
one another such that the project progresses smoothly. However, should, for example, an
email server go down, then messages between the members will be lost or not go through,
causing the network of actors that we contingently call virtual organization to fail, at least
temporarily. Indeed, the growing incidence of viruses attacking the Internet poses a threat to
the common interests of these actors to align together in a network. The viruses are seeking
to enroll software and hardware to do their bidding, thus signaling a refusal to perform
relationally to produce virtual organization.
Observing organizations this way, mixing together humans and nonhumans, without
bracketing anything and without excluding any combination, their contacts are amplified.
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Thus, what results from the practice of translation are hybrids, networks that are both
contingent and emergent. They are contingent in that their relations are never fixed for all
time, such that the actor-networks could come asunder should the interests of any actors
diverge. Similarly, they are emergent in that they do not appear ready formed, as pure
essences that always-already existed.
However, this very practice, the practice of translation, is denied any visibility or
acknowledgement within modern thinking. Purification reclaims the network from the hybrid
ontology of its formation, and renders translation invisible in the process. Thus, purification
obtains in the case of the virtual organization when we no longer think of the diverse
materials that go into its performance, but, instead, simply see it as a thing in and of itself.
Purification is successful when the threads that bind these heterogeneous materials
relationally fall out of view and are simply taken for granted.
Translation and Purification – Organizational Forming
In summary, both practices, translation and purification, are vital to constituting the
world we live in, with one dependent on the other. Without the practices of translation, those
of purification would be without meaning, for we would be dealing with nothing but pure
forms with no possibility of these forms being combined to arrive at some new form.
Likewise, without the practices of purification, those of translation would be hindered,
restricted or discarded, for without pure forms we would have nothing to thread together to
create new forms.
However, with its emphasis on knowing through purification, modernity takes hybrid
networks formed through translation and cuts them into “as many segments as there are pure
disciplines” (Latour 1993a: 3), severing the ties that link nature and society. Through this
separation, even though imbroglios of humans and nonhumans are multiplying and
proliferating, what with “[a]ll of culture and all of nature get[ting] churned up again every
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day “ (Latour 1993a: 2), the distinct ontological zones remain steadfastly separated and
delimited from each other as if the world were divided into such neat categories, into which
anything and everything could be easily slotted.
Being truly modern, therefore, requires that we regard the practices of purification and
translation as separate, while at the same time subscribing to the work of purification and
denying that of translation. To do otherwise, to attend to both at the same time and to
acknowledge the proliferation of hybrids, is to question our modernity and to make us
“retrospectively aware that the two sets of practices have always already been at work in the
historical period that is ending” (Latour 1993a: 11).
In proposing an amodern thesis, Latour seeks to retain modernity’s ontological zones
and its practices of purification and translation, only this time both practices are to be
considered as operating simultaneously, and not separately (e.g., Akrich 1992; Berglund and
Werr 2000; Rottenburg 1996). He is calling to our attention the vast materially
heterogeneous spaces where actor-networks are being performed – built, negotiated, shaped,
ordered, unraveled – and from whence essences, forms, a given order may emerge as effects
(e.g., Brigham and Corbett 1997; Cooper and Law 1995; Czarniawska and Joerges 1995;
Doolin, 2003; Gherardi and Nicolini 2000; Law 1994; Lee and Hassard 1999). It is through
attending to such spaces that we can explore how it is that organizational forming is
performed and address such questions as: How is organizational form performed through
purification (boundary-making, classification)? What translation happens? What hybrids
emerge?
Through beginning to address questions such as these, and through studying the
practices of both purification and translation, we can begin to attend to how it is that an effect
such as organizational form emerges and becomes stabilized, if only temporarily, in the
process seeing form as the product of micro-organizational practices (e.g., Bloomfield and
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Vurdubakis 1999; Lee and Hassard 1999). In so doing, our interest turns to the processes of
organizational forming, to the practices embroiled in constructing and performing an effect
that we call organizational form. From an amodern perspective, that is, organizational form is
both constructed and real.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
When Latour (1993b: 378) asks “What is a video player?” and answers “Probably a
machine”, his position is not that there are no such things as machines, but rather that a video
player may not be a machine. In seeking to problematize the very notion of such a label as
‘machine’, without having first conducted an analysis, he is highlighting the notion that
attached to ready-made labels are a whole series of assumptions relating to form, function
and meaning (Bingham 1996).
If we want to understand organizational form, therefore, the argument put forward by
Latour (1993a: 79, 95) is that it is important not to start out assuming that which we wish to
explain: “The explanations we seek will indeed obtain Nature and Society, but only as the
final outcome, not as a beginning. … The appearance of explanation that Nature and Society
provide comes only in a late phase, when stabilized quasi-objects have become, after
cleavage, objects of external reality on the one hand, subjects of Society on the other. Nature
and Society are part of the problem, not part of the solution.”
Therefore, to start off seeing virtual organization from either a macro perspective or a
micro perspective is to “close off most of the interesting questions about the origins of …
organization” (Law 1992: ¶3). Rather, approaching the problem of understanding differently
and starting from scratch, we could begin by considering interaction and assuming that is all
there is. This would lead to questioning how it is that some interactions are more or less
successful in achieving stability and in reproducing themselves; how it is that some
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interactions more or less succeed in overcoming resistance, such that they take on a macrosocial appearance (Callon and Latour 1981); how it is that some interactions seem to produce
effects such as organizational form, effects with which we had become familiar.
Understanding organizational form this way means, for example, that bureaucracy is
no different in kind to virtual organization, for questions of form become questions of effects
and what is of interest is how these effects come about, how they are generated, if at all.
Hence, for example,
The organization of American business described by Alfred Chandler
(Chandler, 1977)…is a braid of networks materialized in order slips and flow
charts, local procedures and special arrangements, which permit it to spread to
an entire continent so long as it does not cover that continent. One can follow
the growth of an organization in its entirety without ever changing levels and
without ever discovering ‘decontextualized’ rationality. (Latour 1993a: 120122)
Seen in this light, no longer is the large, vertically integrated corporation of which Chandler
writes the decontextualized configuration of macro-level theorizing, readily distinguishable
from any other form through means of classification according to its unique features and
characteristics (e.g., size, scope). Rather, the discrete features characterizing Chandler’s Mform organization have given way to seeing organization as a materially heterogeneous
relational effect made up of ‘a braid of networks materialized in order slips and flow charts,
local procedures and special arrangements.’ Organizational form is no longer an abstract,
static, essentialized concept; rather it emerges as a real, dynamic, material, relational effect
produced, stabilized and sustained through a network of human and nonhuman actors
embroiled in practices of purification and translation.
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